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Abstract
The rationalizability of a choice function on an arbitrary domain under various coherence prop-
erties has received a considerable amount of attention both in the long-established and in the
recent literature. Because domain closedness conditions play an important role in much of ratio-
nal choice theory, we examine the consequences of these requirements on the logical relationships
among diﬀerent versions of rationalizability. It turns out that closedness under intersection does
not lead to any results diﬀering from those obtained on arbitrary domains. In contrast, closed-
ness under union allows us to prove an additional implication. Journal of Economic Literature
Classiﬁcation No.: D11.
Keywords: Rational Choice, Domain Closedness, Coherence Properties.
1 Introduction
A choice function selects a non-empty subset from each set of feasible alternatives within its
domain. This choice function is rationalizable if there exists a binary relation on the universal
set of alternatives such that these choices are performed in accordance with this relation. The two
fundamental forms of rationalizability are greatest-element rationalizability (G-rationalizability,
for short) and maximal-element rationalizability (also referred to as M-rationalizability). G-
rationalizability requires that each element of the set of chosen objects is at least as good as
all elements of the feasible set according to this relation, to be called a G-rationalization. M-
rationalizability demands that the chosen set consists of all elements that are not dominated
by any feasible alternative. That is, according to the relation in question (to be called an M-
rationalization), the set of chosen objects is the set of alternatives for which there exists no
feasible alternative that is strictly preferred.
In addition to the basic notion of rationalizability, various richness properties or coherence
properties may be imposed on a rationalization. We use the term richness condition for the
properties of reﬂexivity and completeness, whereas coherence properties are given by transitivity,
consistency, quasi-transitivity and P-acyclicity. Depending on the combination of the notion of
rationalizability employed, the richness conditions required and the coherence condition imposed,
various deﬁnitions of rationalizability can be obtained. The logical relationships among these
deﬁnitions of rationality on arbitrary domains have been examined in Bossert, Sprumont and
Suzumura (2005a; 2005b; 2005c) and they are summarized in Bossert and Suzumura (2005).
The rationalizability properties on arbitrary domains involving transitive rationalizations or
rationalizations without any additional properties have been characterized by Richter (1966,
1971). In contrast, rationalizability on such arbitrary domains involving weaker coherence prop-
erties has received little attention until recently. Due to the contributions of Bossert, Sprumont
and Suzumura (2005a; 2005b) and of Bossert and Suzumura (2005), characterizations of all
notions of rationalizability are now available.
The generality involved in considering arbitrary domains is obtained at the cost of ignoring
any structural properties the domain of a choice function may possess in speciﬁc contexts. An
important class of domain assumptions that are plausible in many circumstances (see Section
3 for examples) is based on set-theoretic closedness properties. The two domain closedness
properties that have received the most attention are closedness under union and closedness
under intersection. Closedness under union requires that, for any collection of sets each of which
belongs to the domain of a choice function, their union is a member of this domain as well.
Closedness under intersection demands that, whenever the members of a collection of sets are in
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the domain of a choice function and their intersection is non-empty, then this intersection is an
element of the domain as well.
Domain closedness conditions have been employed in the context of transitive rationalizability,
where they are proven to be very useful in providing considerable simpliﬁcations of some results.
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether these domain restrictions also allow us to
simplify the logical relationships among the notions of rationalizability that can be identiﬁed.
It turns out that this is not the case for closedness under intersection: this domain restriction
is not suﬃcient to change the logical relationships among the rationalizability axioms that are
obtained on arbitrary domains. On the other hand, if closedness under union is imposed, an
additional implication emerges. The proof of this new result, which employs the axiom of choice,
is of some interest in its own right. It establishes properties of more general sets than partially
ordered sets.
Our basic deﬁnitions and some preliminary observations are presented in Section 2. Section 3
contains our analysis of the logical relationships between the various notions of rationalizability
in the presence of domain closedness assumptions. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
Let X be a non-empty (but otherwise arbitrary) universal set of alternatives, and suppose R ⊆
X ×X is a (binary) relation on X. The asymmetric factor P (R) of R is deﬁned by
P (R) = {(x, y) ∈ X ×X | (x, y) ∈ R and (y, x) ∈ R},
and the symmetric factor I(R) of R is given by
I(R) = {(x, y) ∈ X ×X | (x, y) ∈ R and (y, x) ∈ R}.
We interpret R as a weak preference relation. Accordingly, P (R) and I(R) are interpreted as
the strict preference relation and the indiﬀerence relation corresponding to R, respectively. The
diagonal relation on X is given by Δ = {(x, x) | x ∈ X}.
Let N denote the set of positive integers. The following properties of a binary relation R are
of importance in this paper.
Reﬂexivity. For all x ∈ X,
(x, x) ∈ R.
Completeness. For all x, y ∈ X such that x = y,
(x, y) ∈ R or (y, x) ∈ R.
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Transitivity. For all x, y, z ∈ X,
[(x, y) ∈ R and (y, z) ∈ R] ⇒ (x, z) ∈ R.
Consistency. For all K ∈ N \ {1} and for all x0, . . . , xK ∈ X,
(xk−1, xk) ∈ R for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} ⇒ (xK , x0) /∈ P (R).
Quasi-transitivity. For all x, y, z ∈ X,
[(x, y) ∈ P (R) and (y, z) ∈ P (R)] ⇒ (x, z) ∈ P (R).
P-acyclicity. For all K ∈ N \ {1} and for all x0, . . . , xK ∈ X,
(xk−1, xk) ∈ P (R) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K} ⇒ (xK , x0) /∈ P (R).
A reﬂexive and transitive relation is called a quasi-ordering and a complete quasi-ordering is
called an ordering.
We refer to reﬂexivity and completeness as richness conditions. This term is motivated by
the observation that the properties in this group require that, at least, some pairs must belong to
the relation under consideration. In the case of reﬂexivity, all pairs of the form (x, x) are required
to be in the relation, whereas completeness demands that, for any two distinct alternatives x and
y, at least one of (x, y) and (y, x) must be in R. Clearly, the reﬂexivity requirement is equivalent
to the set inclusion Δ ⊆ R.
Transitivity, consistency, quasi-transitivity and P-acyclicity are what we call coherence prop-
erties. They require that if speciﬁc pairs belong to R, then certain other pairs must belong to R
as well (as is the case for transitivity and for quasi-transitivity) or certain other pairs must not
belong to R (which applies to consistency and to P-acyclicity). Quasi-transitivity and consis-
tency are independent properties. Transitivity implies quasi-transitivity which, in turn, implies
P-acyclicity. Moreover, transitivity implies consistency, and consistency implies P-acyclicity. The
reverse implications are not true in general. However, the distinction between transitivity and
consistency disappears for a reﬂexive and complete relation; see Suzumura (1983, p.244). Thus,
if a relation R on X is reﬂexive, complete and consistent, then R is transitive, hence an ordering.
Transitivity is the classical coherence requirement on preference relations and its signiﬁcance
in theories of individual and collective choice is evident. Quasi-transitivity was introduced by
Sen (1969; 1970, Chapter 1∗), and it has been employed in numerous approaches to the theory
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of individual and social choice, including issues related to rationalizability. P-acyclicity has the
important property that it, together with reﬂexivity and completeness, is not only suﬃcient for
the existence of undominated choices from any arbitrary ﬁnite subset of a universal set, but it
is also necessary for the existence of such choices from all possible ﬁnite subsets of the universal
set; see Sen (1970, Chapter 1∗).
Violations of transitivity are quite likely to be observed in practical choice situations. For
instance, Luce’s (1956) well-known coﬀee-sugar example provides a plausible argument against
assuming that indiﬀerence is always transitive: the inability of a decision maker to perceive
‘small’ diﬀerences in alternatives is bound to lead to intransitivities. As this example illustrates,
transitivity frequently is too strong an assumption to impose in the context of individual choice.
In collective choice problems, it is even more evident that the plausibility of transitivity can
be questioned. The concept of consistency, which is due to Suzumura (1976), is of particular
interest in this context. As established by Suzumura (1976; 1983, Chapter 1), consistency is
necessary and suﬃcient for the existence of an ordering which subsumes all the pairwise infor-
mation contained in the binary relation. This result generalizes Szpilrajn’s (1930) classical result
on extending quasi-orderings to orderings. Suzumura’s (1976) result was subsequently used by
Donaldson and Weymark (1998) in their proof that every quasi-ordering is the intersection of a
collection of orderings; this result extends Dushnik and Miller’s (1941) fundamental observation
on intersections of linear orders to the case where indiﬀerence is permitted. See Bossert (1999)
for an alternative proof of Donaldson and Weymark’s (1998) result that is based on Szpilrajn’s
(1930) theorem.
Let X be the set of all non-empty subsets of X, let R be a relation on X and suppose S ∈ X .
The set G(S,R) of all R-greatest elements of S is deﬁned by
G(S,R) = {x ∈ S | (x, y) ∈ R for all y ∈ S} (1)
and the set M(S,R) of all R-maximal elements of S is deﬁned by
M(S,R) = {x ∈ S | (y, x) /∈ P (R) for all y ∈ S}.
As is straightforward to verify, G(S,R) is contained in M(S,R) for all relations R on X and for
all S ∈ X . Furthermore, if R is reﬂexive and complete, then G(S,R) = M(S,R); for relations R
that are not reﬂexive or not complete, the set inclusion can be strict.
A choice function is a mapping that assigns, to each feasible set in its domain, a subset of
chosen alternatives from this feasible set. The domain of the choice function depends on the
choice situation to be analyzed, but it will always be a set of subsets of X, that is, a subset of X .
We assume this subset of X to be non-empty to avoid degenerate situations. Thus, letting Σ ⊆ X
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be a non-empty domain, a choice function deﬁned on that domain is a mapping C : Σ → X such
that, for all S ∈ Σ, C(S) ⊆ S. The image of Σ under C is given by C(Σ) = ∪S∈ΣC(S).
The axiom of choice is deﬁned as follows.
Axiom of choice. Suppose that T is a collection of non-empty sets. Then there exists a
function ϕ : T → ∪T∈T T such that ϕ(T ) ∈ T for all T ∈ T .
There are two basic forms of rationalizability properties that are commonly considered in the
literature. The ﬁrst is greatest-element rationalizability which requires the existence of a relation
such that, for any feasible set, every chosen alternative is at least as good as every alternative in
the set. Thus, this notion of rationalizability is based on the view that chosen alternatives should
weakly dominate all feasible alternatives. Maximal-element rationalizability, on the other hand,
demands the existence of a relation such that, for each feasible set, there exists no alternative
in this set that is strictly preferred to any one of the chosen alternatives. Hence, this version
of rationalizability does not require chosen alternatives to weakly dominate all elements of the
feasible set but, instead, demands that they are not strictly dominated by any other feasible
alternative.
In addition to one or the other of these two concepts of rationalizability, we have a choice
regarding the properties that we require a rationalizing relation to possess. We consider the
standard richness requirements of reﬂexivity and completeness and, in addition, the coherence
properties of transitivity, quasi-transitivity, consistency and P-acyclicity. By combining each
version of rationalizability with one or both (or none) of the richness conditions and with one (or
none) of the coherence properties, various deﬁnitions of rationalizability are obtained. Some of
these deﬁnitions are equivalent, others are independent, and some are implied by others. To get
an understanding of what each of these deﬁnitions entails, we summarize all logical relationships
between them in this section.
A choice function C is greatest-element rationalizable, G-rationalizable for short, if there exists
a relation R on X, to be called a G-rationalization of C, such that C(S) = G(S,R) for all S ∈ Σ.
Analogously, a choice function C is maximal-element rationalizable, M-rationalizable for short, if
there exists a relation R on X, to be called an M-rationalization of C, such that C(S) = M(S,R)
for all S ∈ Σ. If a rationalization R is required to be reﬂexive and complete, the notion of greatest-
element rationalizability coincides with that of maximal-element rationalizability because, in this
case, G(S,R) = M(S,R) for all S ∈ X . Without these properties, however, this is not necessarily
the case. Greatest-element rationalizability is based on the idea of chosen alternatives weakly
dominating all alternatives in the feasible set under consideration, whereas maximal-element
rationalizability requires chosen elements not to be strictly dominated by any other feasible
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alternative.
Depending on the additional properties that we might want to impose on a rationalization
(if any), diﬀerent notions of rationalizability can be deﬁned. For simplicity of presentation,
we use the following convention when formulating a rationalizability axiom. We distinguish
three groups of properties of a relation, namely, rationalization properties, richness properties
and coherence properties. The ﬁrst group consists of the two rationalizability properties of G-
rationalizability and M-rationalizability, the second of the two requirements of reﬂexivity and
completeness and, ﬁnally, the third of the axioms of transitivity, quasi-transitivity, consistency
and P-acyclicity. Greatest-element rationalizability is abbreviated by G, M is short for maximal-
element rationalizability, R stands for reﬂexivity and C is completeness. Transitivity, quasi-
transitivity, consistency and P-acyclicity are denoted by T, Q, S and A, respectively. We identify
the property or properties to be satisﬁed within each of the three groups and separate the groups
with hyphens. If none of the properties within a group is required, this is denoted by using
the symbol ∅. Either greatest-element rationalizability or maximal-element rationalizability may
be required. In addition to imposing one of the two richness properties only, reﬂexivity and
completeness may be required simultaneously and we may require rationalizability properties
without either of the two. We only consider notions of rationalizability involving at most one of
the coherence properties at a time. As is the case for the richness properties, imposing none of
the coherence properties is a possibility. Formally, a rationalizability property is identiﬁed by an
expression of the form α-β-γ, where α ∈ {G,M}, β ∈ {RC,R,C, ∅} and γ ∈ {T,Q,S,A, ∅}.
For example, greatest-element rationalizability by a reﬂexive, complete and transitive relation
is denoted by G-RC-T, maximal-element rationalizability by a complete relation is M-C-∅,
greatest-element rationalizability by a reﬂexive and consistent relation is G-R-S and maximal-
element rationalizability without any further properties of a rationalizing relation is M-∅-∅.
Clearly, according to this classiﬁcation, there are 2 · 4 · 5 = 40 versions of rationalizability.
In order to provide a benchmark for our subsequent analysis, we provide a full description of
the logical relationships between these diﬀerent notions of rationalizability. This result, which
synthesizes the contributions of Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2005a; 2005b; 2005c) can
be found in Bossert and Suzumura (2005). For convenience, a diagrammatic representation
is employed. All axioms that are depicted within the same box are equivalent, and an arrow
pointing from one box b to another box b′ indicates that the axioms in b imply those in b′, and
the converse implication is not true. In addition, of course, all implications resulting from chains
of arrows depicted in the diagram are valid.
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Theorem 1 Suppose C : Σ → X is a choice function with an arbitrary non-empty domain Σ ⊆
X . Then
G-RC-T, G-C-T, G-R-T, G-∅-T, G-RC-S, G-C-S, M-RC-T, M-C-T, M-RC-S, M-C-S
↓
G-RC-Q,M-R-T,M-∅-T,
M-RC-Q,M-R-Q,M-C-Q,M-∅-Q → G-C-Q → G-R-Q
↓ ↓
↓ ↓ G-∅-Q
↓
G-RC-A,M-R-S,M-∅-S,
M-RC-A,M-R-A,M-C-A,M-∅-A → G-C-A → G-R-A, G-∅-A ← G-R-S, G-∅-S
↓ ↓
G-RC-∅,G-C-∅,M-RC-∅,
M-R-∅,M-C-∅,M-∅-∅ → G-R-∅, G-∅-∅
As is apparent from this theorem, M-rationalizability does not add any new versions of
rationalizability, provided that all deﬁnitions of G-rationalizability with all of the four coherence
properties are present.
3 Domain Closedness Properties
The theory of rationalizable choice functions on arbitrary domains is general enough to be ap-
plicable to whatever choice contexts we may care to specify. On the other hand, this generality
is obtained at the cost of ignoring any structural conditions that may be imposed on the choice
domain if we pay due attention to the speciﬁc choice context we are focusing on. An important
class of domain restrictions that has been explored quite extensively in the literature on rational
choice is based on set-theoretic closedness properties of the domain Σ. The two properties that
have received the most attention are closedness under union and closedness under intersection.
Closedness under union requires that, for any collection of sets in X each of which belongs to
Σ, their union is a member of Σ as well. Analogously, closedness under intersection demands
that, whenever the members of a collection of sets in X belong to Σ and their intersection is
non-empty, then this intersection is an element of Σ as well.
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These domain restrictions are of importance because they are plausible for several choice
models. For example, closedness under intersection is satisﬁed by the domain consisting of all
compact, convex and comprehensive subsets of Rn+, the non-negative orthant of Euclidean n-
space for n ∈ N. This domain is relevant in axiomatic models of bargaining where the elements
of Rn+ are interpreted as possible utility or payoﬀ distributions among n ∈ N agents that can
be achieved through a bargaining process, and the origin represents the outcome that results if
the agents fail to reach an agreement—the disagreement outcome. Recollect that feasible sets of
utility distributions are usually assumed to be compact, convex and comprehensive.
Closedness under union is satisﬁed, for example, by the domain that consists of all compact
and comprehensive (but not necessarily convex) subsets of Rn+ (or subsets of R
n with suitably
modiﬁed deﬁnitions of comprehensiveness or a weakening of compactness to make the two prop-
erties compatible).
Up to now, the application of these types of domain restrictions has been limited to the study
of full rationalizability—rationalizability by an ordering (recollect that in the case of an order-
ing, it is not necessary to specify whether greatest-element rationalizability or maximal-element
rationalizability is considered because the two notions coincide). The usefulness of these domain
assumptions lies in the fact that they allow us to work with properties that are weaker than others
on arbitrary domains but turn out to be equivalent on suitably speciﬁed domains. In particular,
the assumption of closedness under union implies that rationalizability by an ordering can be
obtained as a consequence of a property that is, on arbitrary domains, considerably weaker than
the requisite necessary and suﬃcient condition for that type of rationalizability. This property
is Arrow’s choice axiom; see Arrow (1959). Furthermore, while closedness under intersection
is not suﬃcient to obtain the equivalence of Arrow’s choice axiom and full rationalizability, it
does imply that Arrow’s choice axiom has some additional strength as compared to its power on
arbitrary domains.
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether new logical relationships, in addition to
those summarized in Theorem 1, emerge under one or the other of these closedness properties. It
turns out that closedness under union leads to an additional implication, namely, that G-C-Q
implies G-RC-A. It is worth mentioning that, unlike most of the earlier literature, we employ
a closedness property with respect to set-theoretic unions that is not restricted to ﬁnite unions.
The reason is that the argument employed to establish the above-mentioned new implication
does not go through if attention is restricted to ﬁnite unions; this will become clear in the proof
(which relies on the axiom of choice). In contrast, closedness under intersection does not give us
any additional results: the same logical relationships as those of Theorem 1 are valid.
We now introduce the formal deﬁnitions of our closedness assumptions. A non-empty domain
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Σ ⊆ X is closed under union if and only if, for all non-empty collections S of elements of Σ,
∪S∈S S ∈ Σ. Analogously, Σ is closed under intersection if and only if, for all non-empty
collections S of elements of Σ, if ∩S∈S S = ∅, then ∩S∈S S ∈ Σ.
Requiring Σ to be closed under union produces a new implication. In particular, it is now
the case that G-C-Q implies G-RC-A so that we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 2 Suppose C : Σ → X is a choice function with a non-empty domain Σ ⊆ X which is
closed under union. Then
G-RC-T, G-C-T, G-R-T, G-∅-T, G-RC-S, G-C-S, M-RC-T, M-C-T, M-RC-S, M-C-S
↓
G-RC-Q,M-R-T,M-∅-T,
M-RC-Q,M-R-Q,M-C-Q,M-∅-Q
↓
G-C-Q → G-R-Q ↓
↓ ↓
G-RC-A,M-R-S,M-∅-S,
M-RC-A,M-R-A,M-C-A,M-∅-A G-∅-Q
↓ ↓
G-C-A → G-R-A, G-∅-A ← G-R-S, G-∅-S
↓ ↓
G-RC-∅,G-C-∅,M-RC-∅,
M-R-∅,M-C-∅,M-∅-∅ → G-R-∅, G-∅-∅
Proof. First, note that all the implications established in Theorem 1 remain valid because
they apply to any domain (and, thus, in particular, to domains that are closed under union).
Therefore, it remains to show that, provided that Σ is closed under union, G-C-Q implies
G-RC-A and that no implications other than those resulting from the theorem statement are
valid.
(a) Suppose Σ is closed under union, and let R be a complete and quasi-transitive G-
rationalization of C. Deﬁne
N = {(x, S) | (x, x) ∈ R and S ∈ Σ and (x, y) ∈ R for all y ∈ S \ {x}} .
If N = ∅, it follows immediately that R ∪ Δ is a reﬂexive, complete and quasi-transitive (and
thus P-acyclical) G-rationalization of C and we are done.
9
Now suppose N = ∅. Let Z denote the set of all non-empty subsets of X × Σ, and deﬁne a
function τ : Σ → Z by τ(S) = {(z, S) | z ∈ C(S)} for all S ∈ Σ. Furthermore, let
T = {τ(S) | S ∈ Σ}.
Let Φ be the set of all functions ϕ : T → ∪T∈T T such that ϕ(T ) ∈ T for all T ∈ T . By the
axiom of choice, Φ = ∅.
For all ϕ ∈ Φ, deﬁne a function gϕ : N → X by
gϕ(x, S) = z ⇔ ϕ (τ(S)) = (z, S)
for all (x, S) ∈ N . Let
G = {g : N → X | there exists ϕ ∈ Φ such that g = gϕ} .
The set G is non-empty because Φ is non-empty.
For all g ∈ G, let
Rg = R ∪Δ \ {(x, y) | there exists S ∈ Σ such that (x, S) ∈ N and y = g(x, S)}.
Clearly, Rg is reﬂexive because Δ ⊆ R.
By the deﬁnitions of N and of G, (x, y) ∈ I(R) for all pairs (x, y) such that there exists
S ∈ Σ with (x, S) ∈ N and y = g(x, S). Thus, (x, y) ∈ P (Rg) for all such pairs which, together
with the completeness of R, implies that Rg is complete. This argument also establishes that
P (R) ⊆ P (Rg).
Next, we show that Rg is a G-rationalization of C. Let S ∈ Σ and x ∈ S.
Suppose ﬁrst that x ∈ C(S). Because R is a G-rationalization of C, (x, y) ∈ R for all y ∈ S
and in particular (x, x) ∈ R. By the deﬁnition of N , this implies (x, S) ∈ N which entails
(x, y) ∈ Rg for all y ∈ S. Thus, x ∈ G(Rg, S).
Now suppose x ∈ G(Rg, S). If there exists y ∈ S\{x} such that (x, y) ∈ R, the completeness of
R implies that (y, x) ∈ P (R) ⊆ P (Rg), contradicting the hypothesis x ∈ G(Rg, S). If (x, x) ∈ R,
the deﬁnition of Rg implies that (x, g(x, S)) ∈ Rg, again contradicting the hypothesis x ∈
G(Rg, S) because, by deﬁnition, g(x, S) ∈ S. Thus, (x, y) ∈ G(R, S) and x ∈ C(S) follows from
the assumption that R G-rationalizes C.
We have now established that Rg is a reﬂexive and complete G-rationalization of C for all
g ∈ G. To complete the proof, we show that there must exist a g ∈ G such that Rg is P-acyclical.
A P-cycle in Rg can be written as a pair c =
(
Kc, {x0c, . . . , xKcc }
)
where Kc ∈ N \ {1} and
xkc ∈ X for all k ∈ {0, . . . , Kc} such that (xk−1c , xkc ) ∈ P (Rg) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , Kc} and
(xKcc , x
0
c) ∈ P (Rg). Without loss of generality, we can assume that the xkc are pairwise distinct.
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Let Cg be the set of all P-cycles in Rg. We need to show that there exists g ∈ G such that
Cg = ∅. By way of contradiction, suppose that Cg = ∅ for all g ∈ G. Consider any g ∈ G and any
c ∈ Cg.
If there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , Kc − 1} such that (xk−1c , xkc ) ∈ P (R) and (xkc , xk+1c ) ∈ P (R),
the quasi-transitivity of R implies (xk−1c , x
k+1
c ) ∈ P (R). The same reasoning implies that if
(xKc−1c , x
Kc
c ) ∈ P (R) and (xKcc , x0c) ∈ P (R), we must have (xKc−1c , x0c) ∈ P (R). Thus, because
Kc is ﬁnite, we can without loss of generality assume that, in any P-cycle, there are never two
consecutive instances of strict preference according to P (R).
If there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , Kc − 1} such that (xk−1c , xkc ) ∈ P (Rg) \ P (R) and (xkc , xk+1c ) ∈
P (Rg) \ P (R), the deﬁnition of Rg implies that there exist S, T ∈ Σ such that (xkc , S) ∈ N ,
xk−1c = g(x
k
c , S), (x
k+1
c , T ) ∈ N and xkc = g(xk+1c , T ). By deﬁnition of N and g, this implies
(xkc , x
k
c ) ∈ R and xkc ∈ C(T ), a contradiction to the assumption that R is a G-rationalization of
C. Thus, there cannot be two consecutive instances of strict preference according to P (Rg)\P (R)
either.
Because R is quasi-transitive and therefore P-acyclical, every P-cycle must contain at least
one instance of strict preference according to P (Rg) \ P (R). Because there cannot be any two
consecutive instances of strict preference according to P (Rg) \P (R) and Kc ≥ 2 for any P-cycle
c by assumption, it follows that every P-cycle must also contain at least one instance of strict
preference according to P (R).
Combining the ﬁndings of the previous three paragraphs, it follows that we can, without loss
of generality, assume that all P-cycles alternate between instances of strict preference according
to P (Rg) \ P (R) and those according to P (R). Thus, for all g ∈ G and for all P-cycles c =(
Kc, {x0c , . . . , xKcc }
) ∈ Cg, we assume that (xk−1c , xkc ) ∈ P (Rg) \ P (R) for all odd k ∈ {1, . . . , Kc},
(xk−1c , x
k
c ) ∈ P (R) for all even k ∈ {1, . . . , Kc}, and (xKcc , x0c) ∈ P (R). Note that this implies
that Kc must be an odd number greater than or equal to three. Furthermore, for all odd
k ∈ {1, . . . , Kc}, there exists Skc ∈ Σ such that (xkc , Skc ) ∈ N and xk−1c = g(xkc , Skc ).
Let Υ be the set of all alternatives in C(Σ) that do not appear in any P-cycle. That is,
x ∈ C(Σ) is an element of Υ if and only if, for all g ∈ G, for all c ∈ Cg and for all odd
k ∈ {1, . . . , Kc}, xk−1c = x. Now deﬁne Σ′ = {S ∈ Σ | C(S) ∩ Υ = ∅}, that is, Σ′ is composed
of those sets S in Σ such that all elements of C(S) appear in some P-cycle. Note that Σ′ = Σ
is possible. Let, for all sets S ∈ Σ \ Σ′, yS be an alternative in C(S) that does not appear in
any P-cycle. Let G ′ be the subset of G containing all functions g such that, for all (x, S) ∈ N
with S ∈ Σ \ Σ′, g(x, S) = yS. Clearly, G = ∅. If Σ′ = ∅, any g ∈ G ′ is such that Cg = ∅, a
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contradiction. Therefore, Σ′ = ∅. Let
T =
⋃
g∈G′
⋃
c∈Cg
⋃
k∈{1,...,Kc}
Skc . (2)
Because G ′ is non-empty and Cg is non-empty for all g ∈ G ′, T = ∅. Because Σ is closed under
union, T ∈ Σ. By deﬁnition, all sets Skc in (2) are elements of Σ′. Because C is G-rationalizable
by R, it follows that, for all y ∈ Skc \C(Skc ), there exists x ∈ Skc ⊆ T such that (y, x) ∈ R. Again
invoking the G-rationalizability of C by R, this implies that
C(T ) =
⋃
g∈G′
⋃
c∈Cg
⋃
k∈{1,...,Kc}
C(Skc ). (3)
Consider any g ∈ G ′, c ∈ Cg and k ∈ {1, . . . , Kc}, and let x ∈ C(Skc ). Because Skc ∈ Σ′,
there exists a P-cycle containing x. Thus, there exists g′ ∈ G ′, c′ ∈ Cg and y ∈ X such that
(x, y) ∈ P (Rg) \ P (R). Furthermore, there exist z, w ∈ X such that (z, w) ∈ P (Rg) \ P (R) and
(w, x) ∈ P (R). By deﬁnition, there exists S ∈ Σ′ such that w ∈ S ⊆ T and, because R is a
G-rationalization of C, x ∈ C(T ). This argument applies to all elements in the union on the
right side of (3) and, therefore, C(T ) = ∅, a contradiction.
To prove that no further implications other than those resulting from the arrows depicted in
the theorem statement are valid, it is suﬃcient to provide examples showing that (b) G-RC-Q
does not imply G-∅-S; (c) G-∅-S does not imply G-∅-Q; (d) G-∅-S does not imply G-C-∅; (e)
G-RC-A does not imply G-∅-Q; (f) G-C-A does not imply G-RC-A; (g) G-R-Q does not
imply G-C-∅; (h) G-∅-Q does not imply G-R-Q; and (i) G-C-∅ does not imply G-∅-A. All of
these examples are such that Σ is closed under union and under intersection.
(b) To show that G-RC-Q does not imply G-∅-S, consider the following example. Let X =
{x, y, z} and Σ = X . Deﬁne the choice function C by letting C({x}) = {x}, C({x, y}) = {x},
C(X) = {x, z}, C({x, z}) = {x, z}, C({y}) = {y}, C({y, z}) = {y, z} and C({z}) = {z}. This
choice function is G-rationalizable by the reﬂexive, complete and quasi-transitive relation
R = {(x, x), (x, y), (x, z), (y, y), (y, z), (z, x), (z, y), (z, z)}.
Suppose R′ is a G-rationalization of C. Because y ∈ C({y, z}), we have (y, y) ∈ R′. Therefore,
y ∈ C({x, y}) implies (x, y) ∈ P (R′). Because y ∈ C({y, z}), we have (y, z) ∈ R′ and, analo-
gously, because z ∈ C({x, z}), we have (z, x) ∈ R′. This implies that R′ cannot be consistent.
(c) We now prove that G-∅-S does not imply G-∅-Q. Let X = {x, y, z, w} and Σ =
{X, {x, y, w}, {y}, {y, z}, {z}}. Deﬁne the choice function C by letting C(X) = {w}, C({x, y, w}) =
{x, w}, C({y}) = {y}, C({y, z}) = {y} and C({z}) = {z}. This choice function is G-rationalizable
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by the consistent relation
R = {(x, x), (x, y), (x, w), (y, y), (y, z), (z, z), (w, x), (w, y), (w, z), (w,w)}.
Suppose C is G-rationalizable by a quasi-transitive relation R′. Because y ∈ C({y, z}), we have
(y, y) ∈ R′. Therefore, y ∈ C({x, y}) implies (x, y) ∈ P (R′). Analogously, z ∈ C({z}) implies
(z, z) ∈ R′ and, therefore, z ∈ C({y, z}) implies (y, z) ∈ P (R′). Because R′ is quasi-transitive, it
follows that (x, z) ∈ P (R′) and hence (x, z) ∈ R′. Furthermore, because R′ is a G-rationalization
of C and x ∈ C({x, y, w}), we must have (x, x) ∈ R′, (x, y) ∈ R′ and (x, w) ∈ R′. Thus,
x ∈ G(X,R′) and, because R′ is a G-rationalization of C, it follows that x ∈ C(X), contradicting
the deﬁnition of C.
(d) Next, we prove that G-∅-S does not imply G-C-∅. Let X = {x, y, z} and Σ =
{{x}, {x, y}, X, {x, z}}. Deﬁne the choice function C by letting C({x}) = {x}, C({x, y}) =
{x, y}, C(X) = {x} and C({x, z}) = {x, z}. C is G-rationalizable by the consistent relation
R = {(x, x), (x, y), (x, z), (y, x), (y, y), (z, x), (z, z)},
but it does not have a complete G-rationalization. By way of contradiction, suppose R′ is
such a relation. By completeness, we must have (y, z) ∈ R′ or (z, y) ∈ R′. Suppose ﬁrst that
(y, z) ∈ R′. Because R′ is a G-rationalization of C and y ∈ C({x, y}), it follows that (y, x) ∈ R′
and (y, y) ∈ R′. Together with (y, z) ∈ R′ and the assumption that R′ is a G-rationalization of
C, we obtain y ∈ C(X), contradicting the deﬁnition of C. Now suppose (z, y) ∈ R′. Because R′
is a G-rationalization of C and z ∈ C({x, z}), it follows that (z, x) ∈ R′ and (z, z) ∈ R′. Together
with (z, y) ∈ R′ and the assumption that R′ is a G-rationalization of C, we obtain z ∈ C(X),
again contradicting the deﬁnition of C.
(e) To prove that G-RC-A does not imply G-∅-Q, let X = {x, y, z} and Σ = X . Deﬁne
the choice function C by C({x}) = {x}, C({x, y}) = {x}, C(X) = {x}, C({x, z}) = {x, z},
C({y}) = {y}, C({y, z}) = {y} and C({z}) = {z}. C is G-rationalizable by the reﬂexive,
complete and P-acyclical relation
R = {(x, x), (x, y), (x, z), (y, y), (y, z), (z, x), (z, z)}.
By way of contradiction, suppose R′ is a quasi-transitive G-rationalization of C. Because y ∈
C({y, z}), z ∈ C({z}) and z ∈ C({y, z}), the assumption that R′ is a G-rationalization of C
implies (y, z) ∈ P (R′). Furthermore, because x ∈ C({x, y}) and y ∈ C({x, y}), we obtain
(x, y) ∈ P (R′). Because R′ is quasi-transitive, it follows that (x, z) ∈ P (R′). This, in turn,
implies (z, x) ∈ R′ and, because R′ is a G-rationalization of C, z ∈ C({x, z}), contradicting the
deﬁnition of C.
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(f) To show that G-C-A is not suﬃcient to imply G-RC-A, let X = {x, y, z, w} and Σ =
{X, {x, y, w}, {x, w}, {y}, {y, z}, {y, z, w}, {y, w}, {w}}. Deﬁne a choice function C by letting
C(X) = {w}, C({x, y, w}) = {x, w}, C({x, w}) = {x, w}, C({y}) = {y}, C({y, z}) = {y},
C({y, z, w}) = {y, w}, C({y, w}) = {y, w} and C({w}) = {w}. This choice function is G-
rationalizable by the complete and P-acyclical relation
R = {(x, x), (x, y), (x, w), (y, y), (y, z), (y, w), (z, x), (z, y), (w, x), (w, y), (w, z), (w,w)}.
Suppose R′ is a reﬂexive, complete and P-acyclical G-rationalization of C. Reﬂexivity implies
that we must have (z, z) ∈ R′. This, in turn, implies (y, z) ∈ P (R′) because C({y, z}) = {y}.
Furthermore, because C({y, w}) = {y, w}, we must have (y, y) ∈ R′ and (y, w) ∈ R′. Thus,
because y ∈ C({x, y, w}), it must be the case that (y, x) ∈ R′ and, because R′ is complete,
(x, y) ∈ P (R′). Because x ∈ C({x, y, w}), it follows that (x, x) ∈ R′, (x, y) ∈ R′ and (x, w) ∈ R′.
Thus, x ∈ C(X) implies (x, z) ∈ R′. The completeness of R′ implies (z, x) ∈ P (R′), contradicting
the P-acyclicity of R′.
(g) To see that G-R-Q does not imply G-C-∅, consider the following example. Let X =
{x, y, z}, Σ = {{x}, {x, y}, X, {x, z}}, C({x}) = {x}, C({x, y}) = {x, y}, C(X) = {x} and
C({x, z}) = {x, z}. C is G-rationalizable by the reﬂexive and quasi-transitive relation
R = {(x, x), (x, y), (x, z), (y, x), (y, y), (z, x), (z, z)},
but it does not have a complete G-rationalization. By way of contradiction, suppose R′ is
a complete G-rationalization of C. Completeness implies that we must have (y, z) ∈ R′ or
(z, y) ∈ R′. Suppose ﬁrst that (y, z) ∈ R′ is true. Because R′ is a G-rationalization of C and
y ∈ C({x, y}), it follows that (y, x) ∈ R′ and (y, y) ∈ R′. Together with (y, z) ∈ R′ and the
deﬁnition of G-rationalizability, we obtain y ∈ C(X), contradicting the deﬁnition of C. Now
suppose (z, y) ∈ R′. Because R′ is a G-rationalization of C and z ∈ C({x, z}), it follows that
(z, x) ∈ R′ and (z, z) ∈ R′. Together with (z, y) ∈ R′ and the deﬁnition of G-rationalizability,
we obtain z ∈ C(X), again contradicting the deﬁnition of C.
(h) To show that G-∅-Q does not imply G-R-Q, consider the following example. Let X =
{x, y, z, w} and Σ = {{x, y}, X, {x, y, w}, {y}, {y, z, w}, {y, w}}, and deﬁne the choice function C
by letting C({x, y}) = {y}, C(X) = {w}, C({x, y, w}) = {y, w}, C({y}) = {y}, C({y, z, w}) =
{z, w} and C({y, w}) = {y, w}. This choice function is G-rationalizable by the quasi-transitive
relation
R = {(x, y), (x, w), (y, x), (y, y), (y, w), (z, y), (z, z), (z, w), (w, x), (w, y), (w, z), (w,w)}.
Suppose R′ is a reﬂexive and quasi-transitive G-rationalization of C. By reﬂexivity, (x, x) ∈ R′
and, because x ∈ C({x, y}) and y ∈ C({x, y}), we must have (y, x) ∈ P (R′) and (y, y) ∈ R′.
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Because y ∈ C({x, y, w}), we have (y, w) ∈ R′. Hence, y ∈ C({y, z, w}) implies (y, z) ∈ R′
because R′ is a G-rationalization of C. Because z ∈ C({y, z, w}), the assumption that R′ is a
G-rationalization of C implies (z, y) ∈ R′ and, thus, (z, y) ∈ P (R′). R′ being quasi-transitive,
we obtain (z, x) ∈ P (R′). Because z ∈ C({y, z, w}), it follows that (z, y) ∈ R′, (z, z) ∈ R′ and
(z, w) ∈ R′. Together with (z, x) ∈ P (R′) ⊆ R′ and the assumption that R′ is a G-rationalization
of C, we obtain z ∈ C(X), which contradicts the deﬁnition of C.
(i) We now show that G-C-∅ does not imply G-∅-A. Let X = {x, y, z, w} and Σ =
{X, {x, y, w}, {x, z, w}, {x, w}, {y, z, w}, {y, w}, {z, w}, {w}}. Deﬁne the choice function C by
letting C(X) = {w}, C({x, y, w}) = {x, w}, C({x, z, w}) = {z, w}, C({x, w}) = {x, w},
C({y, z, w}) = {y, w}, C({y, w}) = {y, w}, C({z, w}) = {z, w} and C({w}) = {w}. C is
G-rationalizable by the complete relation R given by
{(x, x), (x, y), (x, w), (y, y), (y, z), (y, w), (z, x), (z, z), (z, w), (w, x), (w, y), (w, z), (w,w)},
but it does not have a P-acyclical G-rationalization. Suppose R′ is a G-rationalization of C.
Because C(Σ) = X and R′ G-rationalizes C, it follows that Δ ⊆ R′. Because y ∈ C({x, y, w})
and y ∈ C({y, z, w}), the assumption that R′ is a G-rationalization of C implies that we must
have (x, y) ∈ P (R′). Analogously, [x ∈ C({x, z, w}) and x ∈ C({x, y, w})] implies (z, x) ∈ P (R′),
and [z ∈ C({y, z, w}) and z ∈ C({x, z, w})] implies (y, z) ∈ P (R′). Therefore, R′ cannot be P-
acyclical.
Closedness under intersection does not change the results reported in Theorem 1. To see this,
note ﬁrst that all the implications established in that theorem remain true because they are valid
on any domain (and, thus, in particular, on domains that are closed under intersection). Further-
more, the examples employed in the proof of Theorem 1 are all deﬁned on domains that are closed
under intersection and, in addition, G-C-Q does not imply G-RC-A even if Σ is closed under
intersection. To see that this is the case, consider the following example, which establishes the
claim. Let X = {x, y, z, w} and Σ = {{x, y, w}, {x, w}, {y}, {y, z}, {y, z, w}, {y, w}, {w}}, and
deﬁne C({x, y, w}) = {w}, C({x, w}) = {w}, C({y}) = {y}, C({y, z}) = {y}, C({y, z, w}) =
{y}, C({y, w}) = {y, w} and C({w}) = {w}. This choice function is G-rationalizable by the
complete and quasi-transitive relation
R = {(x, y), (x, z), (x, w), (y, y), (y, z), (y,w), (z, x), (z, y), (z, w), (w, x), (w, y), (w,w)}.
Suppose R′ is a reﬂexive, complete and P-acyclical G-rationalization of C. Because C({y, z}) =
{y} and R′ is reﬂexive, we obtain (y, z) ∈ P (R′). Analogously, because C({x, w}) = {w} and R′
is reﬂexive, we must have (w, x) ∈ P (R′). Because y ∈ C({y, w}) and y ∈ C({x, y, w}), we must
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have (y, x) ∈ R′ and, because R′ is complete, it follows that (x, y) ∈ P (R′). Analogously, because
w ∈ C({y, w}) and w ∈ C({y, z, w}), we must have (w, z) ∈ R′ and, because R′ is complete, it
follows that (z, w) ∈ P (R′). Therefore, we have established that (x, y) ∈ P (R′), (y, z) ∈ P (R′),
(z, w) ∈ P (R′) and (w, x) ∈ P (R′), contradicting the P-acyclicity of R′.
4 Concluding Remarks
Domain closedness properties are not the only domain assumptions that are of interest in the
analysis of rational choice. For example, binary domains are considered in Bossert, Sprumont and
Suzumura (2005a) and base domains are analyzed in Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2005c).
A domain is a binary domain if it contains all two-element subsets of the universal set, and a
base domain contains all subsets of the universal set of cardinality one and two. As established in
the above-mentioned contributions, these domain assumptions lead to dramatic simpliﬁcations
of the characterization results that can be obtained for various notions of rationality. Further
domains, such as those consisting of sets that are bounded by hyperplanes, remain to be explored
further in future work.
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